How to Assess the Epistemic Wrongness of Sponsorship Bias? The Case of Manufactured Certainty by Leefmann, Jon
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
published: 05 May 2021
doi: 10.3389/frma.2021.599909






RWTH Aachen University, Germany
Caroline S. Wagner,






This article was submitted to
Research Policy and Strategic
Management,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Research Metrics and
Analytics
Received: 28 August 2020
Accepted: 01 March 2021
Published: 05 May 2021
Citation:
Leefmann J (2021) How to Assess the
Epistemic Wrongness of Sponsorship
Bias? The Case of Manufactured
Certainty.
Front. Res. Metr. Anal. 6:599909.
doi: 10.3389/frma.2021.599909
How to Assess the Epistemic
Wrongness of Sponsorship Bias?
The Case of Manufactured Certainty
Jon Leefmann*
Center for Applied Philosophy of Science and Key Qualifications (ZiWiS), Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg,
Erlangen, Germany
Although the impact of so-called “sponsorship bias” has been the subject of increased
attention in the philosophy of science, what exactly constitutes its epistemic wrongness
is still debated. In this paper, I will argue that neither evidential accounts nor social–
epistemological accounts can fully account for the epistemic wrongness of sponsorship
bias, but there are good reasons to prefer social–epistemological to evidential accounts.
I will defend this claim by examining how both accounts deal with a paradigm case
from medical epistemology, recently discussed in a paper by Bennett Holman. I will
argue that evidential accounts cannot adequately capture cases of sponsorship bias
that involve the manufacturing of certainty because of their neutrality with respect to
the role of non-epistemic values in scientific practice. If my argument holds, it further
highlights the importance of integrating social and ethical concerns into epistemological
analysis, especially in applied contexts. One can only properly grasp sponsorship bias as
an epistemological problem if one resists the methodological tendency to analyze social,
ethical, and epistemological issues in isolation from each other.
Keywords: sponsorship bias, manufactured certainty, epistemic wrongness, error, social epistemology, evidence,
confirmation
SPONSORSHIP BIAS AS AN EPISTEMIC PHENOMENON
In recent years, sponsorship bias has been widely discussed in relation to bias in science (Holman
and Bruner, 2015; Holman and Elliott, 2018). The term refers to the fact that research funded by
industries or other commercial enterprises is more likely than publicly funded research to produce
results in line with the funder’s commercial interests (Lexchin et al., 2003; Sismondo, 2008; Lundh
et al., 2017). Hence, it is also sometimes called preference bias (Wilholt, 2009). There is, however,
disagreement about how to best explain this phenomenon. First, there is a debate about whether
the phenomenon is primarily a form of bias (Wilholt, 2009; Holman and Bruner, 2017; Holman
and Elliott, 2018; Robinson, 2019; Reutlinger, 2020b), viz., an epistemic shortcoming, or whether
it should instead be interpreted as an ethical or political problem (Melo-Martín, 2019). Second, as
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we will see below, epistemic analyses of sponsorship bias differ
over how to explain its epistemic wrongness.1
An epistemic analysis of sponsorship bias can be supported by
noting the various mechanisms that enable incorrect conclusions
to be drawn from scientific data. For example, the preference
for one study design over another is known as design bias.
Other examples concern forms of data-selection bias (favoring
certain data when presenting research results), interpretation bias
(favoring one interpretation and disregarding alternatives), and
publication bias (only publishing results that confirm a preferred
hypothesis while holding back or even suppressing results that
do not).2 These distorting mechanisms can function at the level
of an individual researcher and of an entire scientific community.
For example, an individual researcher can disregard certain data
when drawing conclusions from an experiment, while a research
group can follow rules and practices that promote flawed data
analysis, false conclusions, and erroneous interpretations. These
mechanisms always result in epistemic shortcomings, insofar as
they cause researchers to adopt insufficiently supported or even
false beliefs. Like any account of bias, an analysis of sponsorship
bias must explain exactly what goes epistemically wrong in all
such cases.
However, the role of preference in these biases shows that they
are notmerely epistemic. If sponsorship bias resulted from flawed
reasoning and logical mistakes alone, it would be better described
as an error, rather than a bias. But preferring one set of data
over another, or deciding not to publish uncharitable research,
are forms of practical reasoning. This suggests that sponsorship
bias does not involve mere epistemic wrongness but, rather, such
wrongness that is consciously or unconsciously motivated by
practical interests or preferences. A full account of sponsorship
bias must, therefore, also explain the role of practical interests in
bringing about epistemic wrongness.3
1In focusing on sponsorship bias, I do not wish to insinuate that all interactions
between public research and private sponsors are necessarily epistemically
detrimental or ethically dubious. Private sponsorship can have advantages: In
applied research, there are various examples of collaboration between publicly
and privately funded researchers producing epistemically and socially valuable
results. Moreover, private funding sometimes enables research that would not
otherwise be possible due to a lack of public funding (Wilholt, 2006). Collaboration
between industries and public research institutions can also sometimes accelerate
and intensify research, as shown by the recent development of several vaccines
against COVID-19 infection through the efforts of researchers in competing
biotech companies and public universities. While these positive effects of private
research funding are frequently mentioned in the literature (Adam et al., 2006;
Carrier, 2008; Holman and Elliott, 2018), thorough philosophical and sociological
investigation is needed to determine the exact conditions under which competition
and collaboration between publicly and privately funded research have positive or
negative epistemic effects.
2For an overview and various examples of these biases, see Wilholt (2009) and
Holman and Elliott (2018).
3In this paper, I am only concerned with a form of bias that involves some kind
of practical interest. In the literature, the term “bias” is sometimes used more
broadly to also encompass cases of false reasoning and unjustified belief formation,
irrespective of whether or not they originate in a conscious practical interest. In
the current literature, “bias” is often conceived of as an implicit prejudice against a
(social) object (Beeghly and Madva, 2020). Biased reasoning is thought to result
from the influence of various social, cultural, or economic factors on human
cognition. For examples of the variety of uses of the term, see Goldman (1999),
Resnik (2000).
The most obvious response to this challenge is to simply insist
that the epistemic wrongness of biased research stems from the
influence of political or financial interests on the research process.
Science is thus imagined to be a purely epistemic endeavor4,
which is then tainted by concerns that compromise the pure
pursuit of knowledge by motivating scientists to produce results
that are socially acceptable, politically desirable, or supportive of
social change.
Current mainstream philosophy of science would, however,
not welcome this answer. The idea that science can be totally
free of non-epistemic values has long been recognized as a
philosophical ideal that cannot be realized in practice. To insist
that only research wholly free of social, political, or practical
values and interests is epistemically apt would be to repudiate
the epistemic credentials of almost all actual science. In recent
decades, various philosophers have argued that social, political,
and practical values play a role in science, not only in relation
to the choice of research agendas but also within the research
process (Rudner, 1953; Longino, 1990; Douglas, 2000, 2007). The
argument from inductive risk, for example, purports to show
that scientists inevitably decide whether to accept or reject a
hypothesis in light of evidence about the relative harmfulness of
either endorsing a hypothesis that is, in fact, false, or rejecting
one that is, in fact, true (Rudner, 1953; Hempel, 1965; Douglas,
2009). The harmfulness of making these mistakes cannot be
evaluated without reference to practical, social, or political—i.e.,
non-epistemic—values.5
If we side with the current mainstream in the philosophy
of science and accept that science is inherently value laden6,
we cannot account for the epistemic wrongness of biases
(and of sponsorship bias, in particular) by simply pointing to
the non-epistemic interests and preferences of those involved.
Epistemically unimpeachable research would also be influenced
by such values. One could, of course, point out that there is
no problem with non-epistemic values as such, but only when
certain such values are involved, such as purely commercial
concerns to maximize financial returns on research. Even setting
aside cases where the intrusion of such concerns into science
does not cause epistemic problems (Carrier, 2008), this still
raises the question on how to distinguish between acceptable and
unacceptable non-epistemic values, and this distinction would
have to be justified by reference to pragmatic or ethical rather
than epistemic principles. It is logically impossible to justify the
validity of non-epistemic values using epistemic criteria.7
4I refer to science as value-free only with respect to non-epistemic, viz., social,
political, or moral values. I am not here interested in discussions of the role of
epistemic or cognitive value judgments in theory choice. See, for instance, Kuhn
(1977/2000) and Douglas (2013) on this point.
5The argument from inductive risk is just one example that shows that value-
free science is, at best, an unreachable ideal. There are other arguments for this
conclusion and in much of the sociology of science literature, the impossibility of
value-free science is even taken for granted (Barnes et al., 1996). Adjudicating this
complex issue is, however, far beyond the scope of this paper.
6Though endorsed by many, the claim that scientific practice necessarily involves
non-epistemic value judgments is contested. There is, in fact, a particular debate
about the argument from inductive risk (Betz, 2013, 2017; Melo-Martín, 2016).
7This is, however, not to say that one cannot justify the validity of epistemic and
non-epistemic values by assessing their effects on epistemic practices. For instance,
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Philosophers have offered various explanations of the highly
plausible intuition that sponsorship bias is at least as much of
an epistemic problem as an ethical one and of what exactly
goes epistemically wrong in cases of sponsorship bias. Borrowing
terminology from Reutlinger (2020a), one can divide these into
“evidential accounts” (EAs) and “social epistemological accounts”
(SEAs). In what follows, I will argue that SEAs are better suited
than EAs to account for important features of sponsorship
bias. I will defend this claim by discussing the two types of
accounts through the lens of a paradigmatic example used in
discussions of evidence hierarchies in medical epistemology: the
anti-arrhythmic drug case (AAC). This example was recently
offered by Bennett Holman as a case of sponsorship bias
(Holman, 2019).
The paper proceeds as follows: The Anti-Arrhythmic Drug
Case section and the Sponsorship Bias as Manufactured Certainty
section introduce Holman’s interpretation of the AAC as
a paradigm case of manufactured certainty. The Evidential
Conception of Epistemic Wrongness section and The Social
Epistemological Conception of EpistemicWrongness section briefly
discuss, respectively, Reutlinger’s evidential account of epistemic
wrongness and Wilholt’s social epistemological account. The
Challenging the Evidential Account section, The Problem of
the Target Level section, and the Challenging the Social
Epistemological Account section analyze how these accounts deal
with cases of manufactured certainty. In these sections, I will
also argue that EAs fail to explain the AAC as an instance
of manufactured certainty, while SEAs succeed in doing so, at
least on the level of building expert consensus. I conclude that
the social epistemological account should be preferred over the
evidential account based on its higher explanatory potential in
cases like this.
THE ANTI-ARRHYTHMIC DRUG CASE
In order to evaluate the two analyses of sponsorship bias, I shall
utilize a socially contextualized version of a paradigmatic case
study that is typically interpreted to show the superiority of
statistical evidence over mechanistic evidence in clinical decision
making (Howick, 2011). Holman takes the socio-political context
of the standard version of this case study into account and argues
that it presents an instance of massive sponsorship bias. He
concludes that the case does not provide sufficient grounds to
favor statistical over mechanistic evidence (Holman, 2019) and
that the framework of social epistemology is much more useful
than that of traditional epistemology for analyzing collective
epistemic practices in medicine (Holman, 2019). I will illustrate
these points by presenting both versions of the case, but will
focus my attention on the contextually enriched version that
highlights the role of the pharmaceutical industry’s financial
interests. Howick presents the standard version as follows:
one can validate (non-)epistemic values that shape scientific practices by their
long-term empirical success, i.e., the involvement of (non-)epistemic values in a
scientific practice is justified insofar as they contribute to the overall success of the
practice to produce empirical knowledge. Ohnesorge (2020) has recently made a
similar point. I thank an anonymous reviewer for reminding me of this.
Myocardial infarction often damages the muscle and electrical
system in the heart, leaving it susceptible to arrhythmias. A
common type of arrhythmia, ventricular extra beats (VEBs),
occurs when the left ventricle contracts before it has had time
to fill completely. The heart then fails to pump sufficient blood.
Without treatment, lung, brain, and kidney damage ensues.
Worse, VEBs can also degenerate into ventricular fibrillation,
or complete electrical chaos. Sudden death soon follows
ventricular fibrillation in the absence of electric shock. Large-
scale epidemiological studies suggested that between 25 and 50%
of sudden cardiac deaths were associated with arrhythmias [. . . ].
Based on this understanding of the underlying mechanisms,
several drugs were developed and found to be successful for
regulating VEBs [. . . ]. The drugs became widely prescribed in
the belief that they would reduce cardiac deaths (Howick, 2011,
p. 126).
A [. . . ] comparative clinical study [. . . ] the Cardiac Arrhythmia
Suppression Trial (CAST), which began in 1987, [. . . ] was
designed to test whether antiarrhythmic drugs would reduce
mortality in patients who had suffered frommyocardial infarction
(heart attack). In the study, 27 clinical centres randomized (sic!)
1,455 patients to receive encainide, flecainide, or placebo, while
272 were randomized to receive moricizine or placebo. In April
1989 the encainide, flecainide, placebo arm of the study was
discontinued because of excess mortality in the experimental
groups; 33 of 730 patients (4.5%) taking either encainide or
flecainide had died after an average of 10 months follow-up,
while only nine of 725 patients (1.2%) taking placebo had died
from arrhythmia and non-fatal cardiac arrest over the same time
period. The experimental drugs also accounted for higher total
mortality (56 of 730, or 7.7% vs. 22 of 725 or 3.0%). Similar
negative results were soon found for moricizine (Howick, 2011,
p. 124).
Howick presents this case in order to argue that relying on
mechanistic evidence for clinical decision making can have fatal
consequences when the underlying physiological mechanisms
are complex and insufficiently understood. He argues that the
case shows that mechanistic evidence is not only unnecessary
to establish causal relations but also that basing one’s judgments
on statistical evidence from randomized clinical trials does
a better job in many cases (Howick, 2011). Holman argues,
however, that the standard version omits the broader context
concerning how and why the medical profession first decided
to rely on mechanistic evidence. He contends that the decision
to rely on mechanistic evidence was made despite considerable
disagreement among medical experts. Holman’s version of the
case focuses on the definition of the clinical endpoints of the
studies that were needed by the pharmaceutical companies
to gain FDA approval for their drugs and on the role of
the pharmaceutical industry in establishing these endpoints.
His reconstruction adds three important points that cast the
incident in a completely different light and explain how belief
in mechanistic evidence became prominent in the cardiology
community in the first place.
First, Holman notes that even highly accredited experts who
promoted the hypothesis that VEBs precipitate sudden cardiac
death, such as Bernard Lown, warned that VEBs needed to be
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suppressed “in only a minority of patients, who usually have
ischemic heart disease and a life-threatening or symptomatically
disabling arrhythmia” (Lown, 1979, p. 321). This shows that there
was actually a scope for interpretation about which therapeutic
interventions would be justified if, as hypothesized, suppressing
VEBs could help to prevent cardiac arrest. At least from Lown’s
widely respected perspective, the truth of hypothesis would
not have licensed the widespread prescription of the anti-
arrhythmic drugs.
Second, Holman explains that the FDA and the
pharmaceutical companies together organized a conference to
determine what kind of evidence concerning the drugs’ efficacy
would be required for its approval for therapeutic purposes. The
aim was to achieve expert consensus as to whether the clinical
trials preceding approval should use death as the endpoint of the
study or whether a surrogate endpoint such as the suppression
of VEBs would suffice. The expert panel led by cardiologist Joel
Morganroth consisted of various academic researchers, industry
representatives, and members of the FDA cardio-renal division.
Morganroth received support from various pharmaceutical
companies to determine the agenda of conference and to frame
the subsequent discussions. Holman reports that the speakers at
the conference were primarily proponents of industry-friendly
positions and favored VEB suppression as an adequate (and
cost-efficient) endpoint for the studies. He reports, furthermore,
that Morganroth actively used his position to prevent critical
discussions of the VEB suppression hypothesis when these
were demanded several times by critical researchers during
the conference. Even though it was obvious that there was
considerable disagreement among the experts in attendance
about the therapeutic role of VEB suppression, Morganroth
was able to build a strong coalition in favor of the surrogate
endpoint. The FDA ultimately accepted this conclusion, even
though several FDA members explicitly acknowledged that
VEB suppression was not enough to guarantee the therapeutic
effectiveness of the drugs. The conference not only reached a
decision about the endpoint of the clinical studies but also gave
the impression that the relevant experts all endorsed the VEB
suppression hypothesis (Holman, 2019).
Third, after approval of the endpoints for clinical trials, several
pharmaceutical companies launched a marketing campaign
for their upcoming drugs. This campaign included efforts to
increase the number of industry-friendly scientific publications
on this topic by publishing the same study multiple times
in several high-ranking medical journals and, in some cases,
hindering the publication of contrary evidence. This campaign
was complemented by increased funding for researchers,
such as Morganroth, who promoted the VEB suppression
hypothesis. Several pharmaceutical companies also distributed
copies and reprints of favorable studies to doctors to raise
awareness of their upcoming products and hired industry-
friendly researchers to conduct cardiology seminars for doctors
who might later prescribe the drugs. They also engaged selected
cardiologists in so-called seeding trials, allowing them to
acquire experience of the drugs before they went to market
and to compare them to competing treatments (Holman,
2019).
I will assume, for the purposes of this paper, that Holman’s
enriched version of the anti-arrhythmic drug case is correct.
Holman’s version not only undermines Howick’s interpretation
of the case as revealing the insufficiency of mechanistic evidence
but also presents it as a case of massive sponsorship bias.8
I will argue that it also poses new challenges for the two
kinds of accounts of the epistemic wrongness of sponsorship
bias. First, it challenges evidential accounts because it shows
that decisions about study endpoints and about the kind of
evidence necessary to support a hypothesis cannot be explained
by reference to confirmation theory. False claims about evidential
confirmation relationships can only constitute epistemic wrongs
relative to some predefined standard. Second, it challenges social
epistemological accounts because it shows that compliance with
the methodological standards of a scientific community can have
epistemically detrimental results. I will argue, however, that social
epistemological accounts can respond to this challenge, while
evidential accounts cannot.
My argument will proceed as follows: I will first show that
Holman’s enriched version of the case represents an instance
of sponsorship bias. This will involve identifying the instances
of the research that contributed to the anti-arrhythmic drug
disaster were actually affected by sponsorship bias. Second, I will
explain the challenge to EAs in more detail and show why they
cannot fully account for the features that make the example a
case of sponsorship bias. Finally, I will explain how this case
poses a challenge to SEAs because it shows that infringement
of methodological standards is irrelevant to the ascription of
epistemic wrongness.
SPONSORSHIP BIAS AS MANUFACTURED
CERTAINTY
Holman’s enriched version of the case constitutes a prima facie
drastic case of sponsorship bias. However, because many of the
practices described in the case might equally shape research
that produces valid results, it is necessary to ask whether AAC
is a representative case. As I will show, AAC instantiates a
range of strategies that is widely used by the pharmaceutical
industry. These strategies promote epistemic errors by leading
to the adoption of inappropriate research designs. The enriched
version of AAC also permits an interpretation that contains two
important criteria for sponsorship bias, namely, the occurrence
of an epistemic wrong and the generation of this wrong by some
kind of practical interest.
A plausible interpretation of AAC would be that the
epistemic wrong consists in a research design that is adequate
for determining whether the drugs suppress VEBs but that
is inadequate to determining whether the drugs have any
therapeutic effect. Hence, claiming that the drugs had a
8Holman is not concerned with sponsorship bias in the cited paper, but rather
with the preconditions of a practically relevant medical epistemology. Accordingly,
he uses both versions of the case to illustrate how the traditional, individualist
epistemology that underlies Howick’s criticism of mechanistic evidence fails
to account for the financial, social, and political interests involved in the
determination of epistemic standards in medicine.
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therapeutic effect—a claim that was made by researchers
in several publications and disseminated by the marketing
campaign—was epistemically unjustified, as this had not been
shown by the studies that used VEB suppression as an endpoint.
This epistemic error was only identified in the subsequent
comparative clinical study.9
This epistemic wrong was clearly facilitated by practical
interests. This is revealed by the influence of the pharmaceutical
industry in shaping the make-up and conclusions of the expert
panel and the subsequent marketing campaign, which helped
create the impression that VEB suppression was accepted by
the relevant experts as a guarantee of therapeutic success. The
acceptance of the VEB suppression hypothesis, which led to
the anti-arrhythmic drug disaster, thus stands as a clear case of
manufactured certainty, that is, the impression of certainty over
issues that are actually contested.
It is remarkable, furthermore, that the AAC involved several
well-known strategies that powerful industries typically use to
promote their products. Most of these strategies were pioneered
by the tobacco industry from the 1950s onward and are often
referred to as the tobacco strategy (Oreskes and Conway, 2010),
though they have since been copied by several other industries.
The tobacco strategy seeks to hinder the production of scientific
knowledge contrary to the interest of the industry. The strategy
has five elements: an emphasis on scientific uncertainty, the
support of friendly research, the recruitment of distinguished
scientists, the creation of an echo chamber effect, and attacks
on unfavorable scientific research (Fernandez Pinto, 2017). The
pharmaceutical industry did not utilize all of these strategies in
AAC, and those it did take up were pursued in a comparatively
less aggressive way than by other industries.10 In AAC, the
industry concentrated on recruiting distinguished researchers
(so-called key opinion leaders, such as Morganroth) who
promoted their position, gaining the support of friendly research,
and on creating an echo chamber effect through their marketing
efforts, to get their message across to the medical community. On
the other hand, attacks on unfavorable research, if they occurred
at all, seem to have been rather indirect, such as refusing to fund
critical research. Unlike other uses of the tobacco strategy, the
pharmaceutical industry did not wish to manufacture doubt or
uncertainty in this case. As the description of the expert panel
shows, the pharmaceutical companies rather aimed at promoting
certainty over an issue (the VEB suppression hypothesis) that
was actually uncertain and heavily contested within the research
community. In sum, these efforts served to distort the academic
discourse on the therapeutic efficacy of the anti-arrhythmic
drugs, such that the industry-friendly position gained higher
visibility than dissenting views in scientific publications and the
medical community.
These observations clearly confirm that AAC can be read
as a case of sponsorship bias. Let us now consider how this
9At least this seems a plausible reading. One might, however, object that
researchers did not actually claim that VEB suppression was sufficient evidence
for therapeutic effectiveness, but that this claim was merely an implication of the
regulations issued by the FDA to approve the respective drugs. We will return to
this issue in The Problem of the Target Level section.
10For a comparison see, for example, the analysis by Oreskes and Conway (2010).
case challenges evidential and social epistemological accounts of
this bias.
I will first briefly survey the distinctive features of these two
groups of accounts by examining paradigmatic formulations
of each: Reutlinger’s evidential account of epistemic wrongness
(Reutlinger, 2020b) and Wilholt’s social epistemological account
(Wilholt, 2009, 2013).
THE EVIDENTIAL CONCEPTION OF
EPISTEMIC WRONGNESS
Reutlinger defends an evidential account of epistemic wrongness,
according to which “research affected by sponsorship bias is
epistemically wrong if and only if the researchers in question
make false claims about the (degree of) evidential support of
some hypothesis H by data E” (Reutlinger, 2020b).
This statement primarily concerns the nature of epistemic
wrongness in the empirical sciences. A scientific claim is
wrong insofar as it is not sufficiently supported by evidence.
This account of epistemic wrongness is introduced as the
defining epistemic property of sponsorship bias, so Reutlinger’s
formulation seems to imply that there could, in principle,
be cases of sponsorship bias in which researchers only make
claims that are sufficiently supported by the evidence and that
would not therefore constitute cases of epistemic wrongness.
This implication seems conceptually disturbing—can research be
affected by bias but nonetheless be epistemically flawless?—but I
will not concern myself with this problem here. Rather, I will take
for granted that biased research by definition contains an element
of epistemic wrongness and that this holds ipso facto for research
affected by sponsorship bias.
Reutlinger defends this evidential account by applying insights
from confirmation theory to paradigmatic cases of sponsorship
bias, such as the Bisphenol A case (vom Saal and Hughes, 2005;
Wilholt, 2009; Carrier, 2013; Biddle and Leuschner, 2015), the
Celebrex Case (Brown, 2008), and the tobacco strategy (Oreskes
and Conway, 2010; Proctor, 2012). According to Reutlinger,
the epistemic error in these different cases can be explained
by reference to epistemic principles derived from Bayesian
confirmation theory (Earman, 1992; Sprenger and Hartmann,
2019) and frequentist hypothesis testing (Mayo, 2011a,b). These
theories of evidential confirmation explain what it means for a
set of data E to provide evidential support for a hypothesis H and
thereby formulate accounts of what it means to be epistemically
justified in believing H in light of the available evidence. It is
important for evidential accounts of sponsorship bias to invoke
such principles of epistemic justification because such accounts
explain the epistemic wrongness of a belief in terms of a lack of
epistemic justification for holding the belief as true.
The empirical sciences typically conceive of epistemic
justification in terms of evidential confirmation.11 Bayesian
confirmation theory and frequentist hypothesis testing are
11There are also views in the philosophy of science that deny the possibility of
evidential confirmation altogether (Popper, 1959/2008). However, falsificationism
gains much of its plausibility from its argument against an absolute understanding
of confirmation, as opposed to a probabilistic understanding. Current theories of
evidential confirmation, however, are invariably probabilistic.
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currently the most widely accepted theories of evidential
confirmation (Reutlinger, 2020b). Both are probabilistic theories.
According to the Bayesian confirmation theory, evidence E
supports a hypothesis H, if and only if the probability that
H is true given E and relevant background knowledge K is
higher than the probability that H is true given only the
relevant background knowledge K, or more formally: P(H|E,
K) > P(H|K). Applications of this Bayesian principle, however,
require consideration of a further principle, that of complete
local evidence. This latter principle states that one ought to
always consider all available data produced in an experiment
or series of experiments whenever one wishes to establish
the degree of confirmation of a hypothesis. The principle
of complete local evidence ensures that Bayesian assessments
of subjective probabilities take into consideration potentially
defeating evidence and so guards against confirming hypotheses
based on selective data.
Reutlinger claims that one or both of these basic epistemic
principles are typically violated in paradigmatic cases of
sponsorship bias. For example, the famous Bisphenol A case
(vom Saal and Hughes, 2005) can be interpreted as a case of
biased research because the researchers made false claims about
the evidential support for their hypothesis that low doses of
Bisphenol A do not increase cancer rates in laboratory rats of the
CD(SD) strain. The researchers violated the principle of complete
local evidence because there was evidence available at the time
that CD(SD) rats are insensitive to estrogens and that Bisphenol
A functions as an endocrine disruptor and hence strongly
influences the effects of estrogens. This defeating evidence was
not taken into consideration. Consequently, the researchers also
violated the epistemic principle. By claiming that low doses of
Bisphenol A do not increase cancer rates in laboratory rats of
the CD(SD) strain, researchers suppressed relevant background
knowledge K (i.e., CD(SD) rats are insensitive to the effects of low
doses of Bisphenol A) but nevertheless claimed that the results of
their experiments supported their hypothesis, or more formally:
P(H|E) > P(H|E, K). This is the exact opposite of what Bayesian
confirmation theory demands.
Reutlinger suggests that the other two cases can be interpreted
similarly. In the Celebrex case (Brown, 2008), researchers violated
the principle of complete local evidence because they based their
claim that the anti-arthritis drug Celebrex caused fewer side
effects than its competitors on evidence from only the first 6
months of their study. Had they considered all available evidences
from their own research, the study would not have supported
this claim. Focusing on partial evidence instead of complete local
evidence ignores available and potentially defeating evidence.
In the context of the tobacco strategy, Reutlinger introduces
the case of a researcher who claimed in court that smoking
cannot be said to cause lung cancer because being a cause in
a scientific sense requires constituting a necessary and sufficient
condition for an effect.12 This however, is clearly not the case, as
there are people who smoke and never get lung cancer, as well
as people who get lung cancer despite never having smoked. In
terms of Bayesian confirmation theory, the researcher did not
12The original description of the case can be found in Proctor (2012).
violate either of the two principles in making this claim, but
instead confused the very idea of evidential confirmation from
which these principles derive. Evidential confirmation operates
in probabilistic terms, that is, a hypothesis is more or less likely
to be true depending on the degree of confirmation derived
from the available evidence. That empirical evidence alone can
never establish the necessary and sufficient conditions of an effect
has been recognized at least since David Hume’s discussion of
causation (Hume, 1748/2009).
Reutlinger’s evidential account thus explains paradigmatic
cases of sponsorship bias as cases in which scientists make
false claims based on a misconception of evidential support
relationships. On this account, the epistemic wrongness of
sponsorship bias is, therefore, primarily a feature of the scientist’s
assertions and not of their epistemic practices. The researchers
in the above cases made false claims insofar as they were
unjustified in making these claims given the evidence that was
actually available to them. The problem in the Bisphenol A case,
for example, was not that the researchers used the insensitive
CD(SD) rat strain but that they could have known (and, indeed,
probably knew) that using this strain in an experiment could not
provide evidence that could actually confirm their hypothesis and
yet nevertheless claimed that it did. This shows that evidential
accounts tend to construe biased research as analogous to
erroneous research. Errors occur due to deviations from valid
and generally accepted epistemic principles and researchers
can be blamed for committing such an error if they knew or
should have known the relevant principles.13 Such errors must,
however, be distinguished from false beliefs that do not originate
from such epistemic deviations and have no implications for
blameworthiness. EAs show that bias and error are similar insofar
as bias not only indicates a false belief but a false belief that
should (and often could) have been avoided. Biased research and
erroneous research are thus epistemically wrong for the same
kinds of normative reasons.14
13Blaming someone for an error only seems justified if one supposes that the
person should have known the norms that she violated when making the error.
What someone in a certain situation could or should have known, however,
depends on social norms about what we can reasonably expect each other to know.
14I believe that this coupling of bias and error represents a major problem
with Reutlinger’s account. There are important differences between our ordinary
concepts of bias and error that cannot be accounted for in purely epistemic terms.
Bias implies that violations of valid epistemic principles are brought about in a way
that involves specific and wrongful epistemic practices. For example, one can make
an error due to negligence, inattentiveness, or bad luck, but one’s reasoning is not
rendered biased by such cognitive failures alone. The term bias refers to structural
conditions (cognitive or social) that systematically influence the epistemic practices
that justify one’s beliefs. An error is just the result of processes that are influenced
by these cognitive or social conditions. Reutlinger’s account seems to blur the
distinction between bias and error because his focus on epistemic wrongness
leaves out the conditions of error formation that are decisive for understanding
bias. Insofar as these structural factors are decisive, his evidential account of
epistemic wrongness does not sufficiently discriminate between error and bias as
two subspecies of flawed research and, hence, does not have the resources to fully
explain the phenomenon of sponsorship bias.
Reutlinger might respond that his primary goal was only to deliver an account
of epistemic wrongness, which might later be supplemented with more concrete
descriptions of the mechanisms that make the epistemic wrong more likely to
occur in cases of sponsorship bias. However, while describing such mechanisms
would surely be helpful, it remains unclear how such a description relates to the
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Social–epistemological accounts (SEAs) of the epistemic
wrongness of sponsorship bias approach the phenomenon from
a different angle. Like EAs, they share the intuition that there is
something genuinely epistemically wrong in cases of sponsorship
bias, but they explain the relevant epistemic shortcomings
in terms of epistemic social practices rather than evidential
support. This has the advantage of better accounting for the
social mechanisms that lead to epistemic wrongs in a specific
research setting.
I will here treat Wilholt’s widely discussed SEA as
paradigmatic of this type of account (Wilholt, 2009, 2013).
Wilholt argues that the epistemic wrong in cases like those
discussed above consists in “the infringement of an explicit
or implicit conventional standard of the respective research
community in order to increase the likelihood of arriving at
a preferred result” (Wilholt, 2009, p.99). He argues in a more
recent work that such conventional methodological standards
are epistemically relevant on a collective level because they enable
mutual trust between the members of a research community and
so help to coordinate the joint activity of scientific knowledge
production (Wilholt, 2013, 2016). An important motivation
for SEAs, and for Wilholt’s account in particular, is the critique
of the value-free ideal of science. If one takes seriously the
insight, mentioned above, that all empirical research involves
making judgments based on non-epistemic values and that
complete freedom from such values cannot be the hallmark
of unbiased research, it seems impossible that accepting the
truth of a hypothesis could be epistemically justified solely on
evidential grounds. As the argument from inductive risk shows,
value judgments about the consequences of falsely accepting a
hypothesis are necessarily invoked when determining the degree
of evidential confirmation necessary to endorse a hypothesis. If
the stakes are high, and the consequences of false acceptance are
sufficiently bad, a higher degree of confirmation will be necessary
than in cases where less is at stake. Wilholt argues that it is
impossible to objectively determine the degree of confirmation
necessary for accepting a hypothesis and that any measures
utilized by a specific research community must therefore be
merely conventional (Wilholt, 2009). For example, the level of
statistical significance that determines the degree of confirmation
needed to accept a hypothesis is a methodological convention of
a research community. This level can, in principle, vary between
scientific disciplines and contexts of investigation. However,
even though these standards are merely conventional, they
nevertheless serve an important epistemic function. Without
such common methodological standards, a research community
could not coordinate their research activities in a proper manner.
Methodological conventions are needed to establish mutual trust
in the results of research between the members of a scientific
occurrence of error. What needs to be shown is how, for example, conflicting
interests or financial incentives make the occurrence of the described error more
likely than in cases in which these influences are absent.
community. To see this, consider for example, a research
community that employs various levels of statistical significance
(say 0.05, 0.07, and 0.09), allowing hypotheses to be accepted
or rejected depending on the chosen level of significance.
This ambiguity would lead to confusion about what statistical
significance means and which studies should be accepted as
making valid claims. It would thus undermine the reliability of
research results, and therefore also the coordination of collective
processes of knowledge production.
We can now attend to an important difference between
Reutlinger’s version of EA andWilholt’s version of SEA. Wilholt’s
account accepts the value-ladenness of scientific inquiry and so
centers on the issue of what degree of evidential confirmation C
is needed to accept a hypothesis H in a given context. In contrast,
Reutlinger’s account focuses on the question of whether the
evidence available suffices for the researcher to accept hypothesis
H. For Wilholt, therefore, it is not enough to show for a given
hypothesis H that P(H|E, K) > P(H|K). It is more important, on
this SEA account, to show that the probability of H given a set of
data E and relevant background knowledge K is sufficiently high
to accept H, that is, to show that it exceeds a certain threshold of
evidential confirmation.15 More formally:
P(H|E, K) > C > P(H|K)
The crucial question for Wilholt’s account, therefore, is how
to determine the exact threshold level of confirmation C
such that P(H|E, K) justifies believing H given the available
evidence and background information. This threshold can
only be established conventionally.16 It is therefore impossible
to evaluate the epistemic merits of accepting or rejecting a
hypothesis solely by assessing all of the local evidence using
Bayesian confirmation theory.
Reutlinger (2020b) highlights an obvious problem with the
role of such conventional thresholds in hypothesis confirmation.
Epistemic wrongness can be conventionally defined in terms
of undermining collective epistemic practices that establish a
specific threshold C, but it remains unclear why infringing such
a convention would be epistemically unjustified, for it might
be that the chosen level for C is epistemically inadequate.
Consider, for example, the Bisphenol A case in which, according
to Wilholt’s analysis, the epistemic shortcoming consisted in the
researcher’s infringement of the methodological convention not
to use CD(SD) rats in experiments to determine the carcinogenic
effects of Bisphenol A. Now, onemight say that the reason for this
convention was that evidence gathered using CD(SD) rats does
not raise P(H|E,K) above C. However, if not using the rats was
merely a convention grounded in practical rather than epistemic
15In this respect, Wilholt’s account is reminiscent of Lockean approaches to the
rationality of belief revision [Foley (1992)]. According to the so-called Lockean
thesis, an epistemic agent who assigns credence to propositions in proportion to
the available evidence is required to believe all and only those propositions to
which she assigns sufficiently high credence, viz., credence above some threshold
level t (Shear and Fitelson, 2019). I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for
making me aware of this point.
16It should be obvious that this account requires, at the minimum, that C > 0.5.
However, how much larger than 0.5 the threshold must be cannot be determined
by the available evidence.
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considerations, it seems difficult to argue that the researchers
made an epistemicmistake by using the rats.
If methodological standards are merely conventional, there is
no epistemic reason to believe that one standard is more apt than
another. InWilholt’s framework, methodological conventions are
chosen because of their functionality for coordinating collective
practices, not because they provide epistemic justification
in terms of evidential confirmation (Wilholt, 2013). How
important is this critique of Wilholt’s SEA? In offering a
social–epistemological account, Wilholt is not committed to
individualistic conceptions of knowledge and justification. If one
conceives of scientific knowledge as something produced by a
collective, epistemic justification cannot reside in the reasons
and evidence of any individual researcher. It must instead
reside in the way a scientific community organizes the social
practice of confirming and refuting hypotheses. This, however,
raises the question on how to determine whether these social
practices are epistemically adequate and successful in producing
reliable results.
In defending his social epistemological account, Wilholt
emphasizes the role of the division of cognitive labor in science
(Wilholt, 2013, 2016). If science can only be epistemically
successful as a collective endeavor, the criterion for assessing
the aptness of conventional methodological standards must
be the capacity of these standards to enable collaboration
between scientists and mutual epistemic trust in their ability
and willingness to report reliable results. Trust and reliability
can thus themselves be considered epistemic criteria insofar as
they are important to the sharing of research results and hence
to the effectiveness of the division of cognitive labor and the
collective search for truth. While this argument does not directly
explain why it is epistemically unjustified for an individual
researcher to infringe conventional methodological standards, it
shows that such standards have a crucial epistemic function and
that failure to abide by them can undermine the collaborative
production of scientific knowledge. In SEAs, questions about
epistemic justification must be answered with reference to the
degree to which the relevant social practices are functional for
bringing about beliefs that are appropriately sensitive to the
relevant evidence.
We can now consider how these two paradigmatic accounts of
epistemic wrongness would treat the anti-arrhythmic drug case,
as described by Holman. The Challenging the Evidential Account
section and The Problem of the Target Level section will discuss
problems with EAs. The Challenging the Social Epistemological




In this section, I will argue that EAs are ill suited to account
for the influence of the pharmaceutical industry in AAC because
of their focus on evidential confirmation. EAs ask whether
individual researchers were justified in making a claim based on
the evidence available to them. What does this mean for AAC?
Were the researchers involved in the pharmaceutical industry’s
studies justified in believing that anti-arrhythmic drugs not
only suppressed VEBs but were also therapeutically efficient?
I think that they were, given the officially held and widely
disseminated background belief that the VEB hypothesis was true
and the preliminary evidence from in vitro and animal studies,
which supported the existence of a causal mechanism linking
anti-arrhythmic drugs to VEB suppression. The mechanistic
evidence E combined with the background belief B (that VEB
suppression prevents heart failure and death) to provide stronger
support for the hypothesis H that the anti-arrhythmic drugs were
therapeutically efficient than was given by the background belief
B alone. So P(H|E, B) > P(H|B) holds.17 It also seems hard
to argue that the researchers violated the principle of complete
local evidence. Of course, there probably were studies available
to them that provided counter-evidence to the VEB suppression
hypothesis. However, as these studies were far outnumbered by
publications suggesting the opposite, it seems that individual
researchers cannot be accused of endorsing a hypothesis contrary
to considerable defeating evidence. Even if the counter-evidence
was fairly considered by the researchers, they were—according
to the EA—epistemically justified in drawing the conclusion that
anti-arrhythmic drugs are therapeutically effective.
A natural response to this argument is to argue that every
epistemic agent—and scientists in particular—has a duty to
question all the background assumptions of their claims. In
AAC, this would have involved questioning the plausibility of
the endpoint, the reliability of the expert panel that issued it
as a standard, and the mainstream opinion in the cardiology
community that the VEB suppression hypothesis was true.
Had researchers taken into consideration evidence about the
conditions under which the decision for the endpoint was taken,
they would not have been justified in accepting the background
belief B that the VEB suppression hypothesis was true and that
VEB suppression represented a suitable endpoint for determining
the therapeutic effects of the drugs.
However, this argument is more epistemically demanding
than EAs, or at least than Reutlinger’s, which I here treat
as paradigmatic of EAs. The principle of complete local
evidence only requires assessment of the available local evidence
(Reutlinger, 2020b). The evidence required by this argument
would neither be local nor, to a large extent, available because
the debates in the expert panel were not transparent to the
ordinary scientist, let alone to medical practitioners or patients.
Moreover, the objection requires that individual researchers be
more independent from the knowledge of other scientists than
is plausible and have implausibly extensive abilities to double-
check every premise of their argument. Scientific research in
complex areas such as medicine involves a division of cognitive
labor, which, as many have recognized, requires that researchers
can mutually rely on each other for the truth of their reported
research results, at least to some extent. This is not to say, of
course, that researchers need not or should not check whether
they can reproduce each other’s results. However, this is often
17I use the variable B instead of K because obviously the background belief is in
fact false and, hence, does not amount to background knowledge.
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unnecessary (e.g., when a third party has already done it)
or irrelevant (as when one’s conclusions do not conflict with
background knowledge). While a healthy skepticism is surely
helpful to the scientific endeavor, scientists must make choices
about when it is appropriate to adopt a skeptical stance. Limited
expertise and lack of time are simple pragmatic reasons for
limiting skepticism.
One problem with EAs, therefore, seems to be that they do
not take into account the social context that helps determine
confirmation relationships between hypothesis H, evidence E,
and alleged background knowledge K. EAs do not require
researchers to check for suspiciously skewed distributions of
studies providing either confirming or defeating evidence or to
question the genesis of the background knowledge underlying
(mainstream) work in their field. EA also lacks the means to
inquire into these social conditions because it does not involve
epistemic principles that work at the collective level. It does not
include any rules about how the pursuit of scientific consensus
should be organized so that epistemic goals can be met, and
it says nothing about the distribution of true and false beliefs
within a community. EA accounts are thus of limited use as tools
to analyze cases of sponsorship bias. As this analysis of AAC
shows, researchers canmake false claims and contribute to biased
research without being wrong about evidential confirmation or
misunderstanding confirmation relationships altogether.
THE PROBLEM OF THE TARGET LEVEL
So far, my argument against EA has focused on the claims of
the researchers involved in the trials that used VEB suppression
as an endpoint. This focus may, however, make the argument
against EA too easy because one could object that the researchers
involved in these studies are not the relevant target of its analysis.
Perhaps the epistemically problematic claim in AAC was the
expert panel’s claim that VEB suppression is a valid means of
predicting the long-term survival of patients. This is the claim
that should be regarded as unjustified by the standards of EA
because the evidence concerning the connection between VEB
suppression and heart failure was, in fact, inconclusive and
therefore unsuitable to confirm or falsify the hypothesis.18 It was
this unjustified claim that led to themethodologically flawless but
erroneous research by the individual scientists.
This initially appears to be a more serious objection to my
argument. I will show, however, that this response relies on
a misunderstanding of the applicability of confirmation theory
to this panel’s decision. If one takes these constraints on its
application into account, one sees that the determination of the
study endpoint by the expert panel must be analyzed in ethical as
well as epistemic terms, which goes beyond the scope of EA.
18This argument echoes Howick’s argument for preferring statistical over
mechanistic evidence in therapeutic decision making. Pathophysiological
mechanisms are often unknown or too complex to allow for definite predictions
(Howick, 2011). Consequently, it is too risky to rely on them when there is a
lot at stake. As Howick interprets the case, the failure of the experts was exactly
this—they relied on “low quality” mechanistic evidence about the connection
between VEB suppression and death, when statistical evidence would have been
more appropriate.
The objection that, for EA, the expert panel’s claim is the
relevant target for understanding the epistemic wrongness in
AAC implies that the hypothesis “VEB suppression is a reliable
indicator for therapeutic effectiveness” (H1) was not supported
by the evidence. We do have good reasons to believe that this
was the case. First, as Howick (2011) reports, when the expert
panel met, studies about the supposed causal mechanism linking
VEB suppression and patient survival were ambiguous. In the
absence of conclusive evidence, the experts were unjustified
in endorsing H1; they should have suspended their judgment
because P(H1|E, K) was not, in fact, (significantly) larger than
P(H1|K). On this view, the expert panel failed because it did not
base its endorsement of H1 on conclusive evidence. Second, the
panel did not properly acknowledge views opposing the VEB
suppression hypothesis and thus did not consider potentially
defeating evidence. If the panel had complied with the principle
of complete local evidence, P(H1|E, K) would probably have
actually been smaller than P(H1|K), such that the rational
response would have been to hold that H1 was false.
A proponent of EA can therefore claim that the epistemic
wrongness of AAC consisted in the expert panel making a claim
that was not supported by the available local evidence. However,
this line of reasoning presupposes that it is possible to distinguish
between two different wrongs involved in this case: the epistemic
wrong involved in the panel’s erroneous claim and the ethical
wrong of the panel’s dubious evaluation of the inductive risks
associated with H1. This presupposition is false. I will argue that
it is not possible to clearly distinguish between these two wrongs
in AAC and thus that the above explanation of the EA account
cannot withstand critical scrutiny. More precisely, my argument
is that one can commit the epistemic wrong without committing
the ethical wrong, which EA rightly acknowledges, but that one
cannot commit the ethical wrong without also committing the
epistemic wrong, which EA does not sufficiently acknowledge.
I shall first explain why AAC involved an ethical as well as an
epistemic wrong. It is ethically wrong to prefer the hypothesis
“VEB suppression is a reliable indicator for the therapeutic
effectiveness of anti-arrhythmic drugs” (H1) over the competing
hypothesis “an increased patient survival rate is a reliable
indicator for the therapeutic effectiveness of anti-arrhythmic
drugs” (H2). Such a preference is unethical because the primary
aim of producing the drug should be to heal or at least to
improve the health of patients after heart attacks. Preferring H1
over H2 would not be the optimal choice by this metric even
if H1 was true. Even if the VEB suppression hypothesis was
true and would guarantee patient survival, one could still not
rule out possible further downstream effects on patient health.
To optimally determine the potential risk of a drug, it would,
in any case, have been better to choose an endpoint as far
downstream as possible, which would be the death of the patient.
Therefore, on the assumption that the experts on the panel were
committed to improving patient health, their decision to choose
VEB suppression as a general standard was not only an epistemic
but also an ethical wrong.
Onemight resist the claim that the panel’s decision constituted
an ethical wrong by pointing out that death would not have
been the optimal endpoint from the perspective of all involved.
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Such a choice would, for example, have significantly prolonged
the study and thus delayed the drugs’ availability. This would
have delayed the treatment of patients struggling with heart
disease, leading some to die prematurely. Choosing death as an
endpoint would also not have helped settle academic disputes
about the physiological mechanism underlying the effects of anti-
arrhythmia drugs. As everyone eventually dies, death is the most
unspecific endpoint possible if one is interested in the causal
physiological mechanism of the drug. The expert panel thus
faced a difficult trade-off between these different interests, and
in choosing VEB suppression as a suitable endpoint, they granted
lower priority to the interests of future patients than they should
have. Setting endpoints for clinical trials is always a trade-off
between different values and interests, but very strong arguments
are needed to justify giving a relatively lower priority to the prima
facie duty of benefitting the long-term health and survival of
study participants and prospective patients. The panel did not
seem to offer or consider any such arguments. It is plausible,
therefore, that, even though the panel had to weigh competing
interests, it committed an ethical wrong by, at the least, failing
to provide an ethical justification for its decision to favor VEB
suppression as a clinical endpoint.
Having established that the expert panel committed an ethical
and an epistemic wrong in AAC, I shall now argue that EA does
not appropriately account for the dependence relation between
these wrongs. This leads EA to blur the distinction between error
and bias and to unduly ignore the influence of relevant non-
epistemic factors on epistemic processes. I will now show that the
epistemic wrong of accepting H1 despite inconclusive evidence
depends on the ethical wrong of preferring H1 over H2.
It is certainly logically possible to commit the epistemic wrong
without committing the ethical wrong. An expert panel might
wrongly conclude that the available local evidence favors H1
and yet judge that establishing H1 as an endpoint in a clinical
trial is ethically unjustified. One can consistently endorse the
truth of H1 and deny that H1 is an ethically justifiable endpoint.
However, it is impossible to commit the ethical wrong without
also committing the epistemic wrong. An expert panel cannot
consistently hold that it would be ethically acceptable to define
H1 as the study endpoint while also holding that H1 is wrong.
Anyone committing the ethical wrong necessarily also commits
the epistemic wrong. One simply cannot consistently opt for a
study endpoint that one believes has nothing to do with the
causal effects of the drug. EA cannot properly account for this
relationship between the ethical wrong and the epistemic wrong.
EA describes AAC’s epistemic problem solely with respect to
the fallacious endorsement of H1, and thus abstracts away from
the social conditions that bring this mistake about, including the
ethical wrong. EA does not take into account that the practical
interests that led to the ethical wrong also implied the epistemic
wrong. EA can explain why the expert panel’s conclusion was
wrong, but it cannot account for how the social circumstances
contributed to the panel reaching this wrong conclusion. EA thus
construes AAC as a case of collective cognitive error rather than
of genuine bias. By disconnecting the cognitive aspect of bias
from the non-epistemic, social aspects that cause the error, EA
fails to distinguish between error as a mere epistemic failure and
bias as an epistemic failure caused by non-epistemic motives.
This becomes more obvious when we consider the epistemic
failure in relation to the expert panel’s task of evaluating the
competing hypotheses H1 and H2 in order to determine the
appropriate endpoint for the study. As the case is described, the
expert panel was not epistemically justified in accepting either H1
or H2. In the case of H2, this is because there was no known
biochemical mechanism leading from the use of the drug to
the survival of the patient. Patient survival thus could not have
indicated any therapeutic effect, let alone a specific causal effect
of the anti-arrhythmic drugs. So, with respect to H2, the expert
panel should have suspended judgment. As there was insufficient
evidence for accepting either H1 or H2, the expert panel had
no epistemic reason to prefer either hypothesis. Given that the
panel’s task was to decide which of the two hypotheses was
better supported by the evidence, by the standards of EA, it
should not have endorsed either of them. It should instead have
concluded that the evidence was inconclusive and that more
research was needed.
If this analysis is correct, proponents of EA will struggle to
explain how the epistemic error could have occurred without
accepting that non-epistemic reasons were decisive, such as the
pressure to reach a decision. The epistemic wrong certainly
consisted in falsely asserting that H1 was true, but given that both
options available to the panel were epistemically problematic, the
only possible explanation for their decision is their preference
for H1.
Seen this way, the expert panel’s task was not to determine
which of the two competing hypotheses was better supported by
the evidence, but what kind of standard for epistemic justification
was acceptable in this case. This is an evaluative question that
cannot be answered by evidential considerations alone.
It is significant that EA is neutral on the question of whether
science should be conceived of as value-free. Reutlinger regards
this neutrality as an advantage (Reutlinger, 2020b). The above
discussion, however, shows that EA is of limited use in cases
like AAC because the expert panel was making a decision about
the proper standards for epistemic justification. Such decisions
involve an assessment of the ethical consequences of choosing
one standard over the other, and hence involve value judgments.
So, if proponents of EA wish to insist that the relevant instance
of epistemic wrongness is to be located on the level of the
expert panel, they cannot maintain that an account of epistemic
wrongness can properly ignore the role of values in science and
focus only on narrower evidential concerns. In sum, EA lacks the
resources to explain AAC as a case of epistemic wrongness.
CHALLENGING THE SOCIAL
EPISTEMOLOGICAL ACCOUNT
In order to reach a fully considered decision between the two
proposed analyses of sponsorship bias, it is necessary to also
consider how the social epistemological account treats AAC. I
will argue that AAC also poses a challenge to SEA, but I will
also argue that SEA has better resources than EA to respond to
this challenge.
In AAC, the expert panel established a corrupted
methodological standard. Therefore, it seems that one cannot
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explain the epistemic wrongness of the case in terms of individual
researchers infringing that standard. We still might want to say
that evidence produced by the pharmaceutical industry was
biased, as it was based on the corrupted methodological
standard. However, we cannot make this claim on the grounds
required by SEA, which invoke the epistemic practices of the
whole research community. The pharmaceutical industry’s
research into the effectiveness of the drug was conducted on
the premise that the VEB hypothesis was true and thus was
perfectly in line with the conventional standard of the research
community. Therefore, this research cannot be criticized for
infringing a conventional methodological standard. Rather, the
work of critical researchers who challenged the VEB suppression
hypothesis would have to be accused of this infringement.
However, a proponent of SEAmight mount a similar response
to the proponent of EA and argue that the methodological
standard used by the researchers is not the relevant target
of epistemic critique. This standard was the result of an
infringement of more general standards of scientific discourse
by the expert panel and the FDA. One could argue, for example,
that the expert panel in AAC infringed the rule that in, an open
scientific discourse, all positions should be heard and all relevant
evidence considered. Epistemic wrongness might thus still be
explained as an infringement of a conventional rule. Just as an
EA proponent might want to claim that the panel’s decision was
not properly based on complete local evidence, a proponent of
SEA might want to argue that rules of building a valid scientific
consensus were infringed by (some of) the experts on the panel.
From a social epistemological perspective, there are good
reasons to conclude that the expert panel’s decision-making
process infringed the standards of an epistemically fruitful
scientific discourse. Epistemologists such as Longino (1990) and
Kitcher (2001) have long argued that a plurality of perspectives
and a critical and open discourse are preconditions for successful
scientific inquiry. From the perspective of theoretical frameworks
that emphasize the collective nature of scientific knowledge,
it can plausibly be argued that the rules governing these
collective practices should establish these conditions in order
to enable reliable knowledge production. However, it is highly
doubtful that these rules should themselves be regarded as
merely conventional. Such rules are valid not simply because
they are conventional but because they are grounded in the
epistemological principle that a proposition is more likely to
be true if it can be independently confirmed from multiple
perspectives. Whether a proposition can be confirmed in this
way, however, is not simply a question of actually reaching an
agreement, but of what the different parties deliberating about
the issue actually have reason to believe. The development of
collective knowledge through discourse therefore has a rational
basis. From this perspective, proponents of SEA do seem to have
the resources to explain what went epistemically wrong in EA’s
analysis of the expert panel.19
19SEA might also identify other epistemic errors in AAC. For instance, one might
also argue from a social epistemological perspective that the marketing strategies
applied by the pharmaceutical industry infringed standards of transparency or that
One might wonder whether one could make the same
point from the perspective of Wilholt’s specific SEA, which I
introduced as a paradigmatic of the approach. Wilholt’s account
seems to differ from those of Longino and Kitcher because it
conceives of methodological standards as somehow creating the
conditions under which scientific inquiry can flourish, rather
than as grounded in a foundational epistemic principle such
as the diversity of perspectives. Conventional standards are
epistemically relevant for Wilholt because they enable scientific
inquiry as a collective endeavor. It should, however, also be
possible to conceive of the failure of the expert panel as an
infringement of (higher order) conventional standards from the
perspective of Wilholt’s account. The scientific community must
be able to rely on expert panels to determine methodological
standards in a way that ensures that research aligns with
contextually relevant non-epistemic values. In AAC, these values
would include, most relevantly, the value of promoting public
health rather than private profit. The expert panel should have
chosen a stricter standard than VEB suppression in order to
be worthy of the trust of the broader scientific community.
This analysis assumes that methodological standards should
be representative of the shared values of the members of the
scientific community. The irony is that a conventional standard
can only enable the epistemic trust that Wilholt’s account
demands if it is representative of the shared values of the research
community. From the perspective of a social epistemological
account like Wilholt’s, the expert panel in AAC can be seen to
have disregarded the relevant values of the scientific community.
It thereby not only implemented a dysfunctional standard that
did not enable epistemic trust, but also infringed the (implicit)
norm of finding a standard that was representative of the values
of the research community, and not the pharmaceutical industry.
If we accept this analysis, then we can see that social
epistemological accounts provide a more plausible analysis than
evidential accounts of the kind of manufactured certainty seen
in AAC. I conclude that, insofar as AAC represents a case
of sponsorship bias, SEA has more explanatory power. This
suggests that it is more fruitful to assess the epistemic wrongness
of sponsorship bias from a social epistemological rather than
an individualist perspective. Focusing only on relationships of
evidential support not only neglects the causal influence on
research practices of the preferences of various stakeholders and
how they shape the evaluation of evidential support relationships
but also fails to account for the role of values and decisionmaking
in scientific research. As AAC shows, the latter is crucial, at least
for some paradigmatic cases of sponsorship bias.
CONCLUSION
This paper compared two recent accounts of the epistemic
wrongness of sponsorship bias (SB): the evidential account
(EA) and the social epistemological account (SEA). The
advantages and disadvantages of these accounts were illuminated
by applying them to a paradigmatic case of sponsorship
the one-sided funding of friendly research violated the requirement to give equal
consideration to different perspectives.
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bias. This case can be interpreted as one of manufactured
certainty, in which the financial interests of stakeholders
contributed to the establishing of epistemically inadequate
methodological standards.
Evidential accounts give a convincing account of what goes
epistemically wrong in many cases of sponsorship bias and
identify the fundamental epistemic flaw as involving the making
of assertions that are not backed up by the available local evidence
or that misunderstand evidential support relations. However,
evidential accounts struggle to explain how these epistemic flaws
are produced by the concrete epistemic practices of knowledge-
producing community. As a result, they struggle to properly
distinguish between bias and error, and also to account for cases
such as AAC, which involve infringements of the normative
structure of scientific research. Social epistemological accounts,
on the other hand, can quite easily explain how practices lead to
instances of bias because they explain the epistemic wrongness
of bias in terms of breaking the conventions of scientific
practice. However, as a result of their emphasis on practices
and conventions, SEAs in turn face the problem of providing
an epistemological basis for evaluating the infringement of
merely conventional standards. I have argued that this problem
can be resolved by supplementing the conventional view of
epistemic wrongness with a robust social epistemology that,
like Wilholt’s view, explains the epistemic significance of
conventions through their relevance to collective processes
of knowledge generation. More importantly, however, SEAs,
unlike EAs, also have the conceptual resources to explain
cases of sponsorship bias such as AAC because their focus
on collective practices facilitates analysis of decision-making
processes that are responsive to values as well as to evidence.
These cases suggest that an alleged advantage of EAs, that they
can remain neutral regarding the value-ladenness of science,
is actually a disadvantage. The inability of EA to properly
distinguish bias and error is an expression of exactly this
disadvantage. Approaches like SEA, that link epistemological
concerns with concerns about the role of social and ethical
values in science, are thus more useful than EA for research into
sponsorship bias.
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